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Angola’s attractiveness to PE investors and the potential to increase PE investments in the country are 
explored. Primary data were collected using a survey of 18 PE funds that invest or have considered 
investing in Angola, followed by 10 expert interviews to gain deeper insight into the country’s institutional 
and economic environment, and its potential for PE investments. It is found that most PE funds are attracted 
to Angola by its rapid economic growth and high potential returns. The country is also vastly undersupplied, 
and many key economic sectors are fast developing, presenting exciting opportunities for investors. 
Nevertheless, PE in Angola remains limited, mainly owing to the difficulty of doing business in Angola, and 
owing particularly to the unfavourable regulatory environment. There is no regulation or process when it 
comes to the registration of PE funds in Angola, and any new regulation that applies to foreign investments 
is marred by unnecessary red tape, making it difficult for the investment to enter the market. Only two funds 
are authorised to operate in Angola: Fundo de Investimento Privado de Angola (FIPA), and BESA Activ. 
Streamlining regulation is critical to increasing PE flows to Angola in order to advance the country’s 
economic and social objectives. 
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Private equity (PE) is an important source of 
capital, and has a largely positive impact on 
private-sector growth (International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), 2009; 2010; 2011). This 
applies particularly in the context of emerging 
markets, where financial markets are still 
under-developed. Buyout returns in these markets 
are driven largely by growth and efficiency, 
rather than by leverage or multiple expansions 
(IFC, 2010). According to Makhene (2009), 
measuring the impact of PE on emerging 
markets is important because of its implica-
tions for international development. PE trans-
actions span different geographical areas and 
influence productivity, employment, corporate 
governance, management practices, and the 
broader economy (see, e.g., Cumming, Wright 
& Siegel, 2007; Wright, Gilligan & Amess, 
2009; Wood & Wright, 2009). Nevertheless, 
PE has received little attention in the financial 
press and academic literature (Banerjee, 2008; 
Jenkinson, 2009; Lerner, 2008; Robinson & 
Sensoy, 2011). This gap in the research on PE 
is particularly true of emerging markets (Wright, 
Pruthi & Lockett, 2005; Groh, 2009; Meuleman 
& Wright, 2011). This therefore limits our 
understanding of the impact of PE on private-
sector development in emerging economies. 
At the aggregate level, PE investment in 
emerging markets has increased almost seven-
fold in recent years, rising from US$ 7 to 48 
billion between 2004 and 2008 (Emerging 
Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), 
2011). However, as a share of the global deal 
value, it only increased from 3.8 per cent to 
13.5 per cent, which is still a very small share 
(EMPEA, 2011). Moreover, the distribution is 
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skewed towards a few selected markets, with 
the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa accounting 
for only 2 per cent (US$635 million) of the 
total emerging market PE investment in 2010, 
while Asia took up 64 per cent (EMPEA, 
2011). PE activity peaked at an average of 
US$740 billion in 2007, but slid to an average 
of US$105 billion in 2009 (EMPEA, 2011). 
While the frontier African markets currently 
receive a small fraction of the total emerging 
market PE investments, the region registered 
one of the fastest growth rates among 
emerging markets in 2010 (EMPEA, 2011). 
Angola, for example, reported an annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of over 
13.9 per cent between 2005 and 2010, and a 
sharp decline in inflation from over 100 per 
cent per annum in 2002, to about 13 per cent 
since 2006 (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
2011). Angola’s enormous progress in economic 
growth in the nine years, since the end of its 
27-year long civil war has been driven largely 
by the substantial expansion of its crude-oil 
production and export capacity, bolstered by 
high international oil prices, and political 
stability and peace (McKinsey, 2010). Oil 
prices rose from less than US$20 to more than 
US$145 a barrel in 2008 (McKinsey, 2010). 
The economic growth in Angola notwith-
standing, its government is facing increasing 
pressure to diversify and re-structure the 
economy away from oil into more labour-
intensive sectors. The economy is currently 
heavily dependent on oil revenues, with these 
accounting for nearly 80 per cent of govern-
ment revenue, 90 per cent of exports and 47 
per cent of the country’s GDP (African 
Development Bank (ADB), 2013). This makes 
the economy vulnerable to oil price shocks 
(ADB, 2013). Against this backdrop, PE could 
provide the capital, expertise and experience 
that are critical to supporting private-sector-led 
expansion and growth in the country. This 
would, in turn, help generate new employment 
opportunities, facilitate poverty reduction, and 
support the country’s diversification efforts. 
Given the importance of PE investments, an 
array of factors makes a country conducive  
to these investments. These factors are high 
GDP growth rates (Bain & Company, 2010; 
Meerkatt & Liechtenstein, 2010; IFC, 2010); 
the protection of property and ownership rights 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Schleifer, Vishny, 
2000; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Groh & 
Liechtenstein, 2011; Meerkatt & Liechtenstein, 
2010); good corporate governance (Jensen, 1989; 
Kaplan, 1989; La Porta et al., 2000; Cumming 
et al., 2007; Leslie & Oyer, 2009; Groh & 
Liechtenstein, 2011; Wright et al., 2009; Wood 
& Wright, 2009); regulation and harmonisation 
(Mauro, 1995; Lerner, Sorensen & Stromberg, 
2009; Cumming & Johan, 2007); transparency 
(Cumming & Johan, 2007); the absence of 
barriers to free trade (Lerner et al., 2009); the 
absence of corruption (Mauro,1995; Lerner et 
al., 2009); low or favourable taxation (Gompers 
& Lerner, 1998; Meerkatt & Liechtenstein, 
2010); large deal flow (Groh, 2009); access  
to viable investments (Wright et al., 2005); 
academic and industrial research and develop-
ment (R&D) (Gompers & Lerner, 1998); the 
maturity of the PE market (Groh, 2009); better 
accounting standards (Cumming, Schmidt & 
Walz, 2010); and reasonable government inter-
vention (Lerner, 2002; Brander, Du & 
Hellmann, 2010).  
Nothing has been published on these factors 
in the Angolan context, and this pioneering 
study accordingly investigates, basing the investi- 
gation on a survey and interviews, how the 
Angolan market ranks on these measures/ 
indicators. In this way, Angola’s attractiveness 
to PE investors is explored, as is also its 
potential for increasing PE investments in the 
country. While the country’s market appeal 
and operational challenges and risks to PE 
investment are considered, the results, analysis 
and discussion are founded on a major theme 
derived from the data, the regulatory environ-
ment.  
Before detailing the research methodology, 
the measures/indicators listed above are briefly 
reviewed. 
2 
Literature review – factors 
promoting PE investments 
Superior GDP growth is a key trend attracting 
PE investors to emerging markets (Meerkatt & 
Liechtenstein, 2010). Superior and sustained 
GDP growth permits PE firms to invest 
primarily in companies linked to domestic 
rather than export markets (IFC, 2010).  





Property rights institutions,1 in particular the 
protection of shareholders and creditors by the 
legal system, positively influence long-run 
economic growth, investment and financial 
development (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). 
With a strong legal system, PE firms can 
contract at a distance, knowing that their 
contracts will be enforced (Meerkatt & 
Liechtenstein, 2010), and that banks can con-
fidently provide debt capital.  
Regulation and harmonisation affect invest-
ment volume and portfolio allocations, particu-
larly when transparency is lacking (Cumming 
& Johan, 2007). Barriers to free trade, greater 
complexity in establishing new entities, and 
increased corruption are associated with fewer 
leveraged buyouts (Lerner et al., 2009; Mauro, 
1995). A weaker regulatory environment 
increases the costs associated with managing 
funds in emerging countries, and makes it 
difficult to apply due diligence. 
Taxation also affects the attractiveness of 
countries for PE investments (Meerkatt & 
Liechtenstein, 2010). For example, in their 
study of the United States over a period of 25 
years, Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that 
the capital gains tax influences PE activity – 
with lower tax rates leading to a greater 
quantity of capital raised.  
According to Groh (2009), particular regions 
become attractive to investors only if the deal 
flow is large enough, and the transaction 
volumes and expected payoffs justify the 
increased management costs. Although access 
to debt finance is often regarded as a driver of 
PE activity, in emerging markets where 
financial markets are still under-developed, the 
emphasis appears to be on growth (Banerjee, 
2008; IFC, 2010) and the development of 
equity markets (Lerner et al., 2009) rather than 
on the provision of debt or financial gearing.  
Access to viable investments is another 
important determinant of the attractiveness of a 
regional market to PE investments. Meuleman 
and Wright (2011) find that in emerging 
markets PE firms are more likely to rely on 
local partners through cross-border syndication 
to gain knowledge about the institutional 
environment. The viable investments are 
identified by using valuation models that are 
relatively homogeneous across countries and 
are driven to a large extent by fund type and 
focus (Smolarski, Wilner & Yang, 2011). 
According to Fraser-Sampson (2010), four 
factors, namely earnings, multiples, leverage 
and timing, should work together to create 
value for the investor.  
Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that 
academic and industrial (R&D) expenditure is 
significantly related to venture capital activity. 
In addition, the maturity of the PE market, as 
reflected in the number of players and 
supporting institutions, may attract investors 
(Groh, 2009). As PE funds deliver a good 
performance and build a reputation, they are 
likely to raise follow-on funds with greater 
ease. This is because returns from these funds 
are persistent, and exceed those of first-time 
funds (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
Informational asymmetries can lead to market 
failure, in that some potentially valuable 
transactions might fail to take place, resulting 
in a shortage of entrepreneurial finance 
(Cumming et al., 2010). Although some of 
these asymmetries can be mitigated with the 
use of better accounting standards, leading to 
faster deal origination (Cumming et al., 2010), 
there is a rationale for government intervention 
to fill the void. Governments may be helpful in 
providing certain kinds of support, such as 
financial support, but may become less useful 
when they have actual control over business 
decisions (Brander et al., 2010).  
3 
Research methodology 
Both qualitative and quantitative data-collection 
methods and analyses were used to provide a 
richer contextual basis for interpreting the 
results (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988). Secondary 
data were obtained from a number of sources, 
including country and government reports, 
relevant Angolan laws, sector studies, local 
media articles, published statistics, macro-
economic data and forecasts, accounting state-
ments of Angolan companies, peer-reviewed 
journal articles, and the internet. Last, but not 
least, a review of the Angolan regulatory 
environment was important for the findings to 
be put into context.  
Primary data were collected in October 
2011, using a survey questionnaire and 
interviews. In the questionnaire design phase, 
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exploratory interviews were conducted with 
two industry experts2 in order to confirm the 
measures/indicators used, and to gain new 
insights into the questionnaire design. Before 
launching the survey, a pilot test was 
conducted to ensure that the questions were 
clear and practical. The questionnaire was then 
administered online to local and international 
PE investors with a local presence or interest 
in Angola. Although the responses were 
treated with anonymity, a list of potential 
respondents was compiled prior to completing 
the questionnaire and an identifier was 
assigned to each respondent to ensure that only 
the target audience participated in the survey 
and for tracking purposes during the data 
collection phase.  
Some 78 PE firms were invited to 
participate, 34 of which were identified in 
consultation with experts and our own know-
ledge of the Angolan market. The remaining 
44 are registered members of the South 
African Venture Capital & Private Equity 
Association (SAVCA).  
The questionnaire was organised in three 
sections: 
1) First, in order to gauge the temperament of 
the Angolan investment climate, respondents 
were asked 16 specific questions, to which 
they were required to respond on a 7-point 
Likert scale (see Appendix 1). These 
questions related broadly to all the 
measures/indicators listed and discussed in 
the literature review section. 
2) Secondly, respondents were asked to 
indicate what they considered to be the 
five most attractive features of the 
Angolan market, from the most attractive 
(given a score of 5) – to the least attractive 
(given a score of 1). 
3) Lastly, respondents were asked to select 
the five major deterrents to PE investment 
in Angola, from the most problematic 
(given a score of 5) to the least 
problematic (given a score of 1). 
The objective of the latter two sections was to 
understand the main drivers and barriers to PE 
investments in Angola, as experienced by the 
PE funds, and to build on the data sourced 
from the first section of the questionnaire. 
The last stage of the research process 
consisted of 10 expert, semi-structured face-to-
face interviews with relevant public-sector 
officials and private-sector agents in Angola. 
The informant interviewees included local PE 
funds, financial service providers with an 
Angolan presence, Angolan legal experts, 
development finance institutions and government 
officials, particularly policy-makers. This 
diverse profile of target interviewees helped 
ensure that different perspectives and points of 
view were captured. Questions were mostly 
open-ended, allowing the interviewees to 
explain and build on their responses, and were 
customised according to the experience and 
expertise of the interviewee and the objective 
of the meeting.  
 
Figure 1 
Methodological overview (number of participants in parentheses) 
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In accordance with Angolan government 
protocol, meeting-request letters with public-
sector officials were hand-delivered to the 
appropriate ministry or agency. These letters 
were written in Portuguese, the official language 
of Angola. A follow-up phone call to the 
appropriate secretarial/administration department 
was made where necessary. Each interview 
was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
The research demanded a thorough under-
standing and exploration of the data, in order 
to enable its coding according to predefined 
themes, such as taxation and barriers, as 
discussed in the literature review section of the 
study. In line with similar studies (e.g. Groh, 
2009; Van Deventer & Mlambo, 2009), the 
categorisation and rearrangement of the data 
formed a key component of the data-analysis 
process (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the metho-
dological process of the study. 
4 
Results, analysis and discussion 
Eighteen of the 78 PE firms to whom the 
survey was sent responded, of whom eight 
were SAVCA members. The response rate of 
23 per cent was low, but it was deemed 
acceptable considering the size and maturity of 
the Angolan PE market. Of the 18 respondents, 
16 were investing only in emerging markets, 
while the remaining two were seeking 
opportunities in both developed and emerging 
markets. In terms of regional focus, 14 
invested solely in Africa, two operated in Latin 
America and Africa, and the remaining two 
were focusing generally on emerging markets, 
irrespective of the region. Only seven 
respondents reported having direct exposure to 
the Angolan market, three reported having 
indirect exposure, and the remaining eight 
currently had no exposure. 
4.1 Angola’s market appeal 
The respondents viewed Angola as an attract-
tive destination for PE investments because of 
the country’s high growth (receiving 20.2 per 
cent of scores), access to viable investments 
(receiving 15.6 per cent of scores), the 
competitive advantage of local companies 
(13.6 per cent of scores), and the availability of 
natural resources (12.8 per cent of scores), as 
shown in Figure 2. When it came to Angola’s 
outlook on going forward, the respondents 
were of the opinion that Angola was likely to 
grow strongly in the short to medium term. 
This is indicated by an average score of 5.31 
out of a possible 7, on the Likert scale question 
pertaining to outlook in Appendix 1. The 
responses varied by between one and two 
standard deviations from the mean.  
 
Figure 2 
The most attractive feature of Angola for PE investors (percentage of total scores) 
 
 
From the interviews, it was generally reported 
that many sectors of the Angolan economy are 
still undersupplied. In fact, this presents a 
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given that opportunities in developed markets 
are currently constrained (Banerjee, 2008). In 
addition, the lack of competitive pressures in 
Angola enables companies to charge higher 
premiums and thus increase investor returns. 
However, in line with Allen and Song (2002) 
and Granovetter (2005), the survey respondents 
overwhelmingly believed that networks and 
relationships are crucial to accessing deals in 
Angola. This is indicated by an average score 
of 6.84 out of a possible 7 on the Likert scale 
for Question 4 in Appendix 1.  
With the new liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
facility being the single largest investment ever 
made in Angola (US$9 billion), the oil and gas 
sector is still the most developed sector in the 
Angolan economy. However, investors are 
looking to other, less saturated and under-
supplied sectors like agriculture for untapped 
opportunities (interview). Once a major exporter 
of products, like coffee and cotton, and self-
sufficient in most foods, Angola today is a net 
importer of consumable goods. This is in 
addition to having the sixteenth-largest agri-
cultural potential in the world, according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (African 
Development Bank, 2011), with fertile soils, a 
favourable climate, and rich water resources.  
Opportunities also exist in the mining 
sector, which is currently dominated by 
diamond and petroleum production, as well as 
an abundance of other minerals like gold, 
barite, iron, copper, cobalt, granite and marble. 
With improvements in rail and road networks 
and the improved investor protection under the 
newly-approved Mining Law No 31/11 of 
September 23, 2011,3,4 mining opportunities 
are opening up, and investor interest in the 
sector is reawakening. For example, the Angolan 
PE fund, Fundo de Investimento Privado de 
Angola (FIPA) is expected to invest in the 
expansion and growth of the newly-established 
mining companies (interview). 
Other sectors of interest include breweries, 
cement, industry and telecommunications. 
However, some interviewees expressed concern 
that certain sectors were, in practice, closed to 
foreign investment, and that there was a lack of 
transparency in the granting of licences and 
permits, despite the importance of transparency 
in PE deals (Cumming & Johan, 2007). On the 
other hand, the local banking sector has seen 
phenomenal growth within the past decade 
(Banco de Fomento Angolano (BFA), 2011). A 
law was passed that requires international oil 
companies to channel their payments through 
the domestic banking system, which was 
previously deemed incapable of handling these 
transactions. This new vote of confidence in 
local banks is expected to result in a capital 
boost to the local banking sector of around 
US$10 billion (Reuters, 2011). 
Many interviewees also expressed a keen 
interest in the new public-private partnership 
(PPP) framework under development. The surge 
of modern distribution centres like Shoprite, 
and the growing presence of large industrial 
groups (e.g. Coca Cola, Nestlé and SAB 
Miller), is adding to Angola’s attractiveness as 
far as investment opportunities are concerned.  
4.2 Operational challenges and risks to 
PE investment 
The respondents reported poor accounting and 
reporting standards, followed by weak investor 
protection, as being the most important 
deterrents to PE investment in Angola (see 
Figure 3). The two factors have been cited in 
the literature as being important in PE 
allocation decisions (Groh & Liechtenstein, 
2011; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Schleifer & 
Vishny, 1998). Thus, improving accounting 
standards could help build the much-needed 
investor trust, by mitigating information asym-
metries (Cumming et al., 2010) – particularly 
given that Angola is characterised by high 
corruption and a lack of transparency. Angola 
is ranked at the bottom of the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(168 out of 178 countries).  
Corruption and the use of clientele make it 
difficult to attract foreign equity capital (Lerner 
et al., 2009; Mauro, 1995). However, contacts 
are paramount in identifying PE investment 
opportunities and moving projects forward in 
Angola, as this interviewee points out: 
They [PE funds/financial institutions] will 
look at the shareholding structure of the project 
and they will ask me: what is this person 
bringing to the table? Is it expertise? No. Is he 
providing finance? No. They are right to ask 
these questions; but if I do not have this 
person, I will not get the licence that I need to 
do the project in the first place. 





In this regard, foreign companies are often 
encouraged to partner with Angolan companies, 
many of which turn out to be front organi-
sations for government officials (Global Advice 
Network, 2011). While bad opportunities can be 
‘served on a golden plate’ in Angola, the 
interesting opportunities are not easily 
accessible while acting ethically (interview).  
This makes it particularly hard to engage PE 
capital, because PE funds have to do 
everything by the book (interview). 
Contrary to the opinions of Groh (2009) and 
Leeds and Sunderland (2003) respectively, 
small deal volumes and the absence of a 
market for public securities were not 
considered key factors that were discouraging 
PE investors from increasing their allocations 
to Angola (see Figure 3). Given that small-deal 
volumes are associated with high transaction 
costs, investors presumably expect to earn 
sufficiently high returns to compensate for 
these transaction costs. The low importance 
attached to a market for public securities 
(Figure 3) could suggest that PE investors are 
confident that they can exit their investments 
by other means. Arguably, given the poor 
accounting and contract enforcement standards, 
a public securities market may not be useful. 
 
Figure 3 
The greatest deterrent to PE investment in Angola (percentage of total scores) 
 
 
Despite the importance attached to taxation in 
PE deals (Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Meerkatt 
& Liechtenstein, 2010), the survey respondents 
did not rank taxation as a key deterrent  
to investing in Angola. However, some 
interviewees indicated that the tax rate was too 
high to make PE investments feasible, 
particularly given the returns that foreign 
investors would demand, in order to take on 
the investment risk. According to one 
interviewee: 
Why does a foreign investor want to take on 
Angolan risk? 40 per cent return? This is after 
tax. The tax rate is 35 per cent. And then you 
have your admin fees on top of that. So you are 
looking for an 80 per cent return project. Have 
you found that project? If so, let me know, 
because I am still looking. 
However, the Director of a major pan-
African Investment Bank provided an argument 
counter to this view. In his experience, 
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if they are to invest in Angola, not 40 per cent. 
He also observed that the Angolan corporate 
tax is not dissimilar to that found in other 
countries, and hence is not a particular 
disadvantage in the Angolan PE market.5 
Moreover, the Angolan government offers tax 
exemptions and fiscal incentives that can 
decrease the tax bill and hence improve the 
profitability of companies and the feasibility of 
investments. However, the approval process to 
obtain these exemptions and incentives in 
Angola is mired in red tape. In this regard, a 
review of the Angolan regulatory environment 
will be insightful. 
4.3 The Angolan regulatory 
environment 
The Government of Angola (GOA) has a 
number of pieces of legislation pertaining to 
private investments and the regulation of 
financial markets in the country (GOA, 2003a; 
2003b; 2005a; 2005b; and 2011). One important 
piece of Angolan legislation is the Financial 
Institutions Law No 13/05 of September 30, 
2005, which establishes the basic principles for 
regulating the Angolan financial market. This 
law distinguishes banking from non-banking 
institutions, and assigns regulatory authority to 
appropriate government bodies (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 
Regulatory framework for financial institutions. 
 
 
A second piece of legislation is the Securities 
Law No. 12/05 of September 23, 2005, which 
regulates the trading of all securities in 
Angola. This law is under the control and 
supervision of the Capital Market Commission, 
the Comissão do Mercaco de Capitais (CMC), 
an autonomous entity within the Ministry of 
Finance. The CMC regulates, approves and 
supervises all PE activities in Angola. In 
December 2011, two funds were authorised by 
the CMC to operate in Angola: FIPA and 
BESA Activ. The latter is a real-estate fund, 
managed by Banco Espiritu Santo Angola 
(BESA), a subsidiary of Banco Espiritu Santo 
(BES), a Portuguese bank. 
The first of the two funds, FIPA, is a 
Lxembourg-registered fund and so far is  
the only PE fund exclusively dedicated to 
investing in Angola. In July 2011, it reported 
commitments of US$39 million (short of the 
fund’s initial target of US$100 million). It is an 
initiative of Banco Angolano de Investimentos 
(BAI), an Angolan bank partly owned by 
Sonangol and Norfund. Other subscribers include 
the European Investment Bank, the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 
and the Danish State Investment Fund. FIPA is 
managed by Angolan Capital Partners, an 
Angola-registered company (Giletti, 2011) 
based in Luanda. However, because of its 
foreign registration, FIPA is subject to the 









































investments under Angolan law.  
Foreign investments in Angola are regulated 
and approved by the Angolan Agency for 
Private Investment (ANIP), which was created 
in 2003 to support private-sector development. 
ANIP is responsible for implementing and 
enforcing the new Private Investment Law No 
19/11 of May 2011, which regulates and sets 
out the procedures for the approval of private 
investments. Whereas the old law set the 
minimum investment at US$50,000 for 
nationals and US$100,000 for foreigners,6 the 
new law sets the minimum investment at US$1 
million. This means that ANIP can process 
only investments at or above this threshold, 
and smaller investments will have to be 
processed through other channels. However, 
by investing through alternative channels, an 
investor will forego the attractive fiscal and tax 
incentives granted by ANIP, and will have 
difficulty in repatriating profits out of Angola.  
Even where the PE transaction meets the 
US$1 million minimum requirement for approval 
by ANIP, any subsequent PE investment into 
the investee company requires a new ANIP 
approval and any changes in the investee’s 
shareholding structure require ANIP approval. 
By December 2011, no investment had been 
approved under the new law and process. In 
the best-case scenario, it would take about 145 
days to process an investment application 
through ANIP (Figure 5). This excludes the 
time spent gathering the information and 
documents requested (which include a technical, 
economic and financial feasibility study), and 
the time required to obtain a commercial 
licence, which is applicable to businesses 
intending to perform commercial activities.  
 
Figure 5 
Investment-approval process and time-frames  
 
Sources: Private Investment Law No 19/11 of May 20, 2011; World Bank (2012). 
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Investment Proposal is 
submitted to ANIP 
ANIP accepts 
Investment Proposal 
ANIP submits Investment 
Proposal to the Commission 
of Negotiation of Facilities 
and Incentives (CNFI) 
CNFI delivers opinion on 
Investment Proposal 
Ministry of Commerce issues 
Commercial Licence  
Investment Proposal is 
approved 
Contract is signed 
BNA issues Capital 
Import Licence 




15 days 45 days 
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approval and the US$1 million cannot be 
avoided. Nevertheless, only a once-off approval 
at registration would be required, and would 
not have to be repeated each time the fund 
intends to complete a transaction. BESA Activ 
(the second fund registered with the CMC) 
benefits from a preferential arrangement with 
the Central Bank, Banco Nacional de Angola 
(BNA), which allows it to transfer capital in 
and out of the country without ANIP’s 
approval (interview). Unfortunately, information 
on the requirements and eligibility criteria for 
such an arrangement could not be accessed. 
5 
Conclusion 
The study explores the factors that attract 
and/or deter PE investments in Angola. It was 
found that most PE funds are attracted to 
Angola first and foremost by its high economic 
growth and high potential returns. Other 
attractions, in order of importance, include 
access to viable investments, the competitive 
advantage of local companies, the availability 
of natural resources, the quality of manage-
ment teams, government support programmes, 
access to networks and the size of the domestic 
market. The country is also vastly under-
supplied, and many key economic sectors are 
fast developing, which presents an array of 
exciting opportunities for investors. However, 
networks and relationships are very important 
in accessing early-stage deals in Angola. 
A number of deterrents to PE investment in 
Angola were also cited. These are, in order of 
importance, poor or extremely weak accounting 
and reporting standards, weak investor and 
property rights protection, difficulty for 
businesses in enforcing contracts, red tape, 
political risk, the absence of reliable or 
experienced partners, corruption and the worst-
in-the-world corporate ethics, the low quality 
of business plans, difficulty in obtaining 
information on deal flows, difficulty in 
accessing debt finance, few supporting 
institutions such as banks and accounting 
firms, an unfavourable tax environment, poor 
and almost non-existent public securities 
markets, and small deal volumes. Respondents 
also felt that the current Angolan regulatory 
environment discourages PE investment and 
the government’s effort to create a business-
friendly policy environment is rather ineffective. 
Even simple things such as immigration 
procedures were reported to be extremely 
inefficient. 
As can be observed from the above 
discussion, the deterrents outweigh the attract-
tions. Thus PE in Angola remains limited, 
owing not necessarily to the lack of investor 
interest, but to the difficulty of doing business 
in the country, particularly in relation to the 
unfavourable regulatory environment. Thus 
streamlining regulation is seen as critical to 
increasing PE flows to Angola, and to 
advancing Angola’s economic and social 
objectives. 
A comparative study of the regulation in 
Angola with that of other countries could 
provide valuable information on how regula-
tion could be designed to promote PE 
investment more effectively. This represents 
an important area for future research. Current 
regulation pertinent to PE investment could, 
for example, be analysed and compared with 
similar regulation currently in place in South 
Africa, which is the main destination for PE 
flows in Sub-Saharan Africa. The lessons 
learned from a broader study would be 
invaluable to other African countries where PE 




1 Institutions are broadly defined as the "rules of the game" that structure the political, economic and social interactions 
supporting the effective functioning of market economies, by ensuring that economic transactions do not incur undue costs 
or risks (North, 1990). 
2  One is a reputable individual with a significant number of years of experience in the industry and the other is an academic 
active in research on the topic. 
3 The new mining law came into effect on 23 December, 2011. Under the new law: 1) the holders of mining titles are entitled 
to the commercial right of the product of exploration (Article 188); 2) state involvement is still demanded, but set at a 
minimum of 10% (Article 11). 
4 The Mining Law 1/92 of January 17 1992, failed to provide such protection. The diamond sector was regulated by Diamond 
Law No. 16/94 of October 17, 1994. 





5 The corporate tax rate in Angola was recently lowered from 35% to 30%.  
6 In practice, a US$ 200 million threshold was often applied to foreign investment. 
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Perceptions about the Angolan investment climate 
[A summary of survey results emphasising key areas of concern for investors. Each bar represents 
the average response on the Likert scale, with the numbers of valid responses per question given in 
parentheses] 
Question Average of responses [Number of responses in parentheses] 
1. How would you describe the 
outlook for Angola’s economy 
in the short to medium term (1–
3yrs)? 
  1 = will likely be in  7 = will have strong     
recession      growth 
 
  [18] 
2. How would you rate the 
protection of property rights in 
Angola? 
  1 = very weak 7 = very strong 
    [18] 
3. How would you assess the 
ability of businesses to enforce 
contracts in Angola? 
  1 = very difficult 7 = very easy 
  [18] 
4. How important are networks 
and relationships to access 
early-stage deals in Angola? 
  1 = not that important 7 = critical 
  [18] 
5. How would you compare the 
corporate ethics* of firms in 
Angola – with those of other 
countries in the world? 
1 = amongst the worst 7 = amongst the best in 
 the world  
  [18] 
6. How effective are the Angolan 
government's efforts to create a 
business-friendly policy 
environment for private equity 
investors? 
  1 = very ineffective 7 = very effective 
  [18] 
7. To what extent does Angola’s 
tax regime affect incentives to 
invest in private equity? 
 1 = significantly limits 
 incentives to invest 
7 = has no impact on 
incentives to invest 
  [18] 
8. If you have already visited 
Angola, how would you rate the 
efficiency of immigration 
procedures (e.g. ease of 
getting a visa to visit the 
country)? 
   1 = extremely inefficient 7 = extremely efficient 
  [16] 
9. How easy is it for investors to 
obtain information on PE deals 
in Angola? 
  1 = impossible   7 = extremely easy 
  [18] 
10. To what extent do rules and 
regulations governing foreign 
investment in Angola 
encourage or discourage PE 
investment? 
1 = strongly discourage 
 PE investment 
7 = strongly encourage 
PE investment 
  [18] 
continued/  
 





Question Average of responses [Number of responses in parentheses] 
11. How would you assess the 
level of sophistication of the 
financial markets in Angola? 
1 = poor by international 
standards 
7 = excellent by inter- 
national standards 
  [18] 
12. How easy is it to raise debt 
finance in Angola? 
  1 = very difficult  7 = very easy 
  [17] 
13. How important is the existence 
of a well-functioning local 
securities market in 
determining your country 
investment focus? 
  1 = not that important   7 = critical 
  [18] 
14. How would you assess 
financial auditing and reporting 
standards regarding company 
financial performance in 
Angola? 
  1 = extremely weak   7 = extremely strong 
  [17] 
15. To what extent do you rely on 
local partners to invest 
internationally? 
  1 = to a great extent   7 = not at all 
  [17] 
16. How easy is it for you to obtain 
information about changes in 
regulation and government 
policies that affect business 
activity in Angola? 
   1 = impossible   7 = extremely easy 
  [18] 
* Referring to ethical behaviour in interactions with public officials, politicians and other enterprises 
 
